Public Pension Reform and the Takings Clause by Kent, Michael B.
Belmont Law Review
Volume 4 Symposium 2016: The Modern Metropolis –
Contemporary Legal Issues in Urban Communities Article 1
2017
Public Pension Reform and the Takings Clause
Michael B. Kent
Campbell University - Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Belmont Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Belmont Law Review by an authorized editor of Belmont Digital Repository. For more information, please contact repository@belmont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kent, Michael B. (2017) "Public Pension Reform and the Takings Clause," Belmont Law Review: Vol. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss1/1
 1
PUBLIC PENSION REFORM AND THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE 
MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.* 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 2 
I. THE STATUS OF PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS UNDER STATE LAW ............ 4 
A. Gratuity View ............................................................................. 4 
B. Contract View ............................................................................ 5 
C. Property View ............................................................................ 8 
II. THE VALUE OF A TAKINGS CLAUSE CHALLENGE ................................... 9 
A. Property View States ................................................................ 11 
B. Contract View States ................................................................ 13 
III. EVALUATING WHETHER “PROPERTY” HAS BEEN “TAKEN” ................ 14 
A. The “Property” Requirement ................................................... 15 
B. The “Taking” Requirement ...................................................... 15 
1.  Analytical Framework for Determining a “Taking” ........ 16 
2.  Difficulties in Applying the Framework to Public Pension 
Reform ............................................................................. 17 
C. Choosing the Proper Test ......................................................... 18 
1.  The Case for the Penn Central Test ................................. 18 
2.  The Case for the Per Se Rule ........................................... 22 
IV. EVALUATING “PUBLIC USE” AND “JUST COMPENSATION” ................. 25 
A. The “Public Use” Requirement ................................................ 25 
B. The “Just Compensation” Requirement ................................... 26 
1.  “Dollar-for-Dollar” Valuation ......................................... 26 
2.  Arguments Against “Dollar-for-Dollar” Valuation ......... 27 
3.  The Possibility of Non-Cash Compensation .................... 30 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 33 
 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University. 
Thanks to Brannon Denning for helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Jordan Spanner 
for valuable research assistance. 
2 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1: 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the many current issues facing state and local governments, 
perhaps one of the most pressing is public pension reform. According to the 
U.S. Census Bureau, there are nearly 4,000 public pension systems in the 
United States, the vast majority (3,742) of which are administered by local 
governments.1 As of 2014, these systems had more than 19,000,000 
members and more than 9,000,000 beneficiaries receiving periodic 
payments.2 But many of these systems are in serious financial trouble, 
collectively facing unfunded liabilities that, by some estimates, equal 
approximately $4.7 trillion.3 In light of these shortfalls, many states have 
enacted a variety of reform measures to stave off fiscal collapse,4 and these 
reforms have drawn numerous legal challenges from public sector 
employees and retirees. 
One of the challenges often asserted by these plaintiffs is that 
changes to public pension plans violate the Takings Clause of the federal 
constitution or one of its state constitutional counterparts. Despite the 
frequency with which they are raised, however, these claims seldom receive 
engaged analysis by the courts, and they have been given a sort of second-
class treatment by most legal scholars. On one level, this treatment is not all 
that surprising. Because most public pension plans are deemed to create 
contract rights in their participants, the Contracts Clause seems the more 
obvious provision under which to analyze pension plan changes. As a 
result, takings challenges are often overshadowed by challenges brought 
under the Contracts Clause, with many courts and commentators viewing 
them as largely duplicative. Additionally, even when takings challenges are 
treated independently, the number of troublesome issues and the general 
messiness of takings doctrine make meaningful analysis difficult. 
Even so, I contend that the short shrift given to the Takings Clause 
in this context is unwarranted. As an initial matter, the notion that public 
pension plans create contracts between government employers and 
employees is not universally accepted. A handful of states explicitly reject 
                                                 
 1. Phillip Vidal, Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered 
Defined Benefit Data Summary Report: 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, July 2015, at 5, 
available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/econ/g14-
aspp-sl.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. See Joe Luppino-Esposito, Promises Made, Promises Broken 2014: Unfunded 
Liabilities Hit $4.7 Trillion, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.alec.org/article/promises-made-promises-broken-2014-unfunded-liabilities-hit-
4-7-trillion/. 
 4. These reform measures have included increasing employee contributions, reducing 
cost of living adjustments, changing age and service requirements, adjusting the way in 
which benefits are calculated, and converting from defined benefit plans to some type of 
alternative. See T. Leigh Anenson et al., Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 12 (2014) (listing recent reform measures); Stuart Buck, The Legal Ramifications of 
Public Pension Reform, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 49 (2012) (same). 
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that approach, holding instead that such plans create property interests. In 
these “property states,” the Contracts Clause clearly provides no protection 
against plan changes but the Takings Clause might. Far from being 
duplicative, in these jurisdictions, takings claims form the most viable 
constitutional challenge to reform. 
But the Takings Clause has significance even in the majority of 
states that accept the contract view. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
the Contracts Clause would only prohibit impairments to those plans that 
were not “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”5 
No such justification attends a Takings Clause analysis, however, which 
focuses on the effects of a regulation rather than its purposes. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has held that a focus on the government’s purpose or motive 
“has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”6 As such, it is possible 
that a law might be upheld under the Contracts Clause but nevertheless 
amount to an unconstitutional taking. Again, rather than merely duplicating 
the Contracts Clause, in the right case, a takings challenge could achieve an 
entirely different result. And, given that fact, it is all the more important to 
consider the issues that a takings claim would raise. 
This Article seeks to fill the gap left open by previous judicial and 
scholarly treatment and begin a more robust conversation about the role of 
the Takings Clause in public pension reform litigation. In service of that 
larger objective, this Article has two primary goals. The first, advanced in 
Parts I and II, is to make the case for taking the Takings Clause seriously in 
this context. Because a takings claim depends upon the existence of a 
cognizable property right, Part I addresses the legal status of public pension 
benefits. Although a small number of states view such benefits as gratuities, 
most states regard them as creating either contract or property rights in plan 
participants. As such, public pension benefits are subject to certain 
constitutional protections—namely, those afforded by the Contracts Clause, 
the Due Process Clause, or the Takings Clause. Part II addresses the 
particular significance of the Takings Clause, distinguishing it from the 
other two provisions and demonstrating its potential value for plan 
participants under both the “property view” and the “contract view” of 
public pensions. 
The second goal, more modest but equally important, is to consider 
(although not necessarily resolve) some of the legal issues that any serious 
evaluation of a takings claim must confront. Part III begins this 
consideration, focusing on how courts might go about determining whether 
a particular reform measure effects a taking of property in the first instance. 
This task requires fitting challenges to public pension reform within the 
Supreme Court’s analytical framework for regulatory takings, which in turn 
necessitates a choice about the appropriate test to apply. Assuming that a 
                                                 
 5. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). 
 6. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). 
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reform measure is deemed to effect a taking, Part IV turns to the 
constitutional requirements of “public use” and “just compensation,” with 
particular emphasis on the thorny questions raised by the latter. 
I. THE STATUS OF PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS UNDER STATE LAW 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”7 Most state constitutions contain similar constraints on the 
government’s taking authority.8 Because the Takings Clause protects 
“private property,” a threshold issue in any takings case is whether the 
claimant has a protectable property interest at the time the taking is alleged 
to have occurred.9 The Supreme Court has indicated that, in most cases, that 
issue will be governed by the laws of the various states.10 To appreciate the 
significance of a takings challenge to public pension reform efforts, 
therefore, it is first necessary to understand the status of public pension 
benefits under state law. 
A. Gratuity View 
The traditional view adhered to by most states until the mid-
twentieth century was that public pensions amounted to a mere gratuity.11 
Under this view, pension benefits given to public employees were 
considered to be “a bounty springing from the appreciation and 
graciousness of the sovereign,” and as such, could be “modified, revised, 
amended, superseded, or repealed by the Legislature” at its discretion.12 
Where this view of public pensions holds, neither takings protections nor 
                                                 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Chi., B. 
& Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897). 
 8. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“[P]rivate property shall not be taken for, or 
applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor.”); WIS. CONST. art. I, 
§ 13 (“The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation 
therefor.”). A notable exception is the North Carolina Constitution, which contains no 
explicit takings protections. See Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54, 68 (N.C. 1998) (noting the 
absence of express constitutional takings provision). Even so, the North Carolina courts have 
recognized the basic protections of the Takings Clause to form part of the fundamental law 
of the state. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); see also L.C. Canyon Partners v. Salt Lake Cnty., 266 P.3d 797, 805 (Utah 2011) 
(employing similar analysis under state constitution). 
 10. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 
U.S. 702, 707 (2010) (plurality); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998). 
 11. See Buck, supra note 4, at 49-50; Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: 
The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 619 (2010). 
 12. Blough v. Ekstrom, 144 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957). 
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other constitutional constraints limit the government’s ability to reform its 
retirement system.13 
Today, only three states—Arkansas, Indiana, and Texas—continue 
to adhere to the gratuity approach, and even those states do not apply that 
approach with full force. The courts in Arkansas and Indiana make a 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary pension plans, and they 
follow the gratuity view only with regard to those plans in which the 
employee had no choice but to participate.14 Voluntary plans, by contrast, 
have been held to create contracts in both states, and the courts have 
protected certain aspects of those contracts against subsequent changes.15 In 
Texas, all public pension plans continue to be governed by the gratuity 
approach,16 but the state appears to have applied its power sparingly with 
regard to recent reform measures.17 The result is that most states, even those 
that continue formally to adhere to the traditional gratuity view, treat public 
pension plans as creating some form of protectable right or interest in at 
least some circumstances.18 
B. Contract View 
The majority of states have moved away from the gratuity approach 
by protecting plan participants under principles of contract law. Although 
most jurisdictions apply some type of contract view to their public 
retirement systems, wide variety exists in the details. The primary 
differences concern how the contract is created, when the contract becomes 
effective, and what terms the contract includes. 
A number of states specifically identify their pension plans as 
contractual relationships via constitutional or statutory pronouncement.19 In 
                                                 
 13. See Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 16 (explaining that governments operating 
under gratuity approach “may be constrained by moral and policy concerns, but not the 
law”). 
 14. See Robinson v. Taylor, 29 S.W.3d 691, 693-94 (Ark. 2000) (holding that plan 
funded entirely by employer without any voluntary contributions from employee was 
gratuity); Ballard v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 324 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ind. 1975) 
(distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary plans). 
 15. See, e.g., Jones v. Cheney, 489 S.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Ark. 1973); Bd. of Trs. of 
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204, 208-09 (Ind. 1985). 
 16. See, e.g., Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Tex. 
2015). 
 17. See Monahan, supra note 11, at 620 n.4 (noting that recent changes to state 
pension plan applied to new hires only, leaving benefits for current employees untouched). 
 18. Aside from policy concerns about leaving public employees wholly unprotected, 
state constitutional provisions prohibiting the gifting of public funds also counsel against the 
gratuity approach. See id. at 619-20 (citing Yeazell v. Coplin, 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965)). 
 19. Seven states provide for contract rights in their constitutions. See ALASKA CONST. 
art. XII, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art XXIX, § 1(C); HAW. CONST. art XVI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. 
XII, § 5; LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(A) & (B); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24; N.Y. CONST. art. V, 
§ 7. At least three states explicitly provide such rights by statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 121.011(3)(d); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 25(5); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:13-22.33. 
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most states, however, courts have inferred the existence of a contract (or 
similar relationship) based on the statutory language creating a pension 
plan, promises and representations made to plan participants, employees’ 
reasonable expectations and reliance interests, or other relevant facts and 
circumstances.20 Although the reasoning of these decisions is by no means 
uniform, a leading rationale for the contract view is that pension plans 
create a unilateral contract whereby the government offers retirement 
benefits as a form of deferred compensation, which the employee accepts 
through job performance.21 Other states, while admitting that the strict 
application of contract principles does not reflect the realities of public 
pension programs, have nonetheless reached a similar result under theories 
of quasi-contract.22 
In addition to differing about how the contract is created, states 
following the contract view also vary with regard to when the contract is 
deemed to form. In several jurisdictions, the contract is formed as of the 
first day of employment,23 while in others the contract is not effective until 
                                                 
 20. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Fund v. Cary, 373 So. 2d 
841, 842 (Ala. 1979); Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 801 (Cal. 1947); Colo. 
Springs Fire Fighters Ass’n, Local 5 v. City of Colorado Springs, 784 P.2d 766, 770 (Colo. 
1989); Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trs., 464 A.2d 894, 896 (Del. 1983); Withers v. 
Register, 269 S.E.2d 431, 432 (Ga. 1980); Nash v. Boise City Fire Dep’t., 663 P.2d 1105, 
1108-09 (Idaho 1983); Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 473 (Kan. 1980); Jones v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Ky. 1995); Bd. of Trs. of Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys. v. Mayor of Balt. City, 562 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1989); Christensen v. Minneapolis 
Mun. Emps. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Minn. 1983); State ex rel. Sullivan v. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 571 P.2d 793, 795 (Mont. 1977); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 
541, 548-51 (Neb. 1995); Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Bd. v. Washoe County, 615 P.2d 972, 974 (Nev. 
1980); Cloutier v. State, 42 A.3d 816, 822-24 (N.H. 2012); Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54, 
60-61 (N.C. 1998); Taylor v. State & Educ. Emps. Grp. Ins. Program, 897 P.2d 275, 278-79 
(Okla. 1995); Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 20 (Or. 2015); Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. 
Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 479 A.2d 962, 965-66 (Pa. 1984); Arena v. City of 
Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 393 (R.I. 2007); Tait v. Freeman, 57 N.W.2d 520, 522 (S.D. 
1953); Blackwell v. Quarterly Cnty. Court, 622 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tenn. 1981); Utah Pub. 
Emps.’ Ass’n v. State, 131 P.3d 208, 215-16 (Utah 2006); Burlington Fire Fighters Ass’n v. 
City of Burlington, 543 A.2d 686, 689 (Vt. 1988); McAllister v. City of Bellevue Firemen’s 
Pension Bd., 210 P.3d 1002, 1004 (Wash. 2009); Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 181 (W. 
Va. 1995). 
 21. See, e.g., Moro, 351 P.3d at 20-22; Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536, 538 
(Wash. 1956). 
 22. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 327-28 (Mass. 1973) 
(acknowledging infeasibility of fitting statutory retirement system into “ordinary contract 
law,” and explaining that use of “contract” in this context “is best understood as meaning 
that the retirement scheme has generated material expectations on the part of employees and 
those expectations should in substance be respected”); Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 748 
(rejecting “conventional contract approach” to public pensions but finding protectable 
interest under theory of promissory estoppel). 
 23. See Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 22-23 (identifying Alaska, California, 
Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, and Massachusetts as employing the “first day” rule). 
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the employee actually retires or is qualified to do so.24 Still other 
jurisdictions understand the contract to form at some intermediate point, 
which generally depends upon the reasonable expectations and reliance 
interests of the employee.25 
A final point of divergence among the “contract states” concerns 
what precisely is protected by the contract once formed. For example, a 
number of state courts have interpreted the public pension contract to 
protect both past and future accruals of benefits, usually as a result of 
language found in their state constitutions.26 In these jurisdictions, 
“[e]mployees who are already in the system could not be subject to any 
plan amendment that results in a lower benefit than that calculated under 
the terms of the plan at their dates of enrollment.”27 Other states—again, 
typically as a result of constitutional language—construe the contract as 
protecting only past benefit accruals, meaning that the government cannot 
diminish benefits already earned but can amend the pension plan 
prospectively.28 In most states, however, courts construe the terms of the 
contract in light of the statutory language creating the pension system, as 
well as the government’s course of conduct relative to that system.29 As 
such, courts in different states can reach widely divergent results on 
whether a particular benefit is included within the contract. For example, 
some courts have concluded that state tax exemptions for public retirement 
benefits were an included term of the pension contract, while others have 
held such exemptions to lie outside the contract.30 Recent litigation over 
                                                 
 24. See id. at 26 (identifying Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and Ohio as following 
this “last day” rule). 
 25. See id. at 27; see also Singer, 607 P.2d at 474 (“Continued employment over a 
reasonable period of time during which substantial services are furnished to the employer, 
plan membership is maintained, and regular contributions into the fund are made . . . cause 
the employee to acquire a contract right in the pension plan.”); Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 62-63 
(explaining that determination of whether contract forms is “rooted in the protection of 
expectational interests upon which individuals have relied through their actions, thus gaining 
a vested right”). 
 26. See Monahan, supra note 11, at 622-24 (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, and 
New York as following this approach). 
 27. Id. at 624. 
 28. See id. at 624-25 (placing Hawaii, Louisiana, and Michigan in this group). 
 29. See id. at 627 (noting that “the pension contract includes the statutory provisions 
relevant to the retirement plan,” as well as “long-standing administrative practices related to 
the retirement plan”). 
 30. Compare Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 63 (“[I]t is clear the tax exemption was a term or 
condition of benefits of the Retirement Systems to which plaintiffs have a contractual 
right.”), with Sheehy v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Div., 864 P.2d 762, 766 (Mont. 1993) (“We hold 
that . . . state employees retiring prior to [alterations in the tax exemption] did not have a 
contractual right to continued exemption from taxation of their state retirement benefits.”). 
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changes to plan participants’ cost-of-living adjustments similarly has 
produced conflicting outcomes.31 
Irrespective of the aforementioned differences, once a contract is 
formed, the rights and benefits of plan participants included within the 
contract become subject to constitutional protections. Chief among these 
protections is the prohibition against state impairment of the contractual 
relationship.32 Additionally, because contracts generally qualify as property 
for purposes of the Takings Clause, the restrictions of that provision also 
apply.33 
C. Property View 
A handful of states have rejected the view that public pension plans 
create contracts and suggest instead that plan participants have rights best 
described as some form of property.34 Still other states, while not rejecting 
the contract approach outright, seem to emphasize plan participants’ 
property rights as paramount when addressing changes to public pension 
programs.35 
Typically, courts that reject the contract view do so as a result of 
the “unmistakability doctrine,” under which a statute is recognized to create 
contract rights only where there is “some clear indication that the 
legislature intends to bind itself contractually.”36 Because “the principal 
                                                 
 31. Compare Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 209-11 (Colo. 2014) (finding no contract 
right to unchangeable COLA), with Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 393-95 (R.I. 
2007) (holding that retirees had right to lifetime COLA without alteration). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts. . . .”). 
 33. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (“Contract 
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for public purposes provided that just 
compensation is paid.”); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (“Valid contracts 
are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the 
United States. Rights against the United States arising out of a contract with it are protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 809-10 (Conn. 1985); Spiller v. 
State, 627 A.2d 513, 517 n.12 (Me. 1993); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 301-02 (N.M. 
1995). New Mexico has since codified this property right in its state constitution, see N.M. 
CONST. art. XX, § 22(D), although the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the 
provision must “be read harmoniously” with its earlier decision in Pierce. Bartlett v. 
Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 892 (N.M. 2013). 
 35. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 652 
(Ohio 1998) (suggesting that participant had a cognizable property right in certain aspects of 
public retirement system, but rejecting the claim that participant had contract rights); Wis. 
Prof’l Police Ass’n v. Lightbourn, 627 N.W.2d 807, 840-41 (Wis. 2001) (discussing contract 
rights as species of participants’ protected property interests); see also Peterson v. 
Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 1996) (suggesting that 
“legitimate retirement expectations may constitute property rights”). 
 36. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 
451, 465-66 (1985); see also Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 808 (applying this rationale to public 
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function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that 
establish the policy of the state,”37 any ambiguity that the public pension 
statutes were legislatively intended to bestow contract rights is resolved 
against the creation of a contract.38 At the same time, these courts have 
declined to follow the traditional gratuity approach because it gives the 
government “an unfettered power” to revoke public pension plans, resulting 
in too little protection for plan participants.39 Accordingly, under this view, 
plan participants are deemed to have property rights (though not contract 
rights) in certain aspects of the plan.40 
Because of these property rights, subsequent changes to the public 
pension system may trigger certain constitutional concerns. At least three 
courts, for example, have expressly noted that property interests in public 
pension plans are subject to due process protections.41 Accordingly, plan 
participants are entitled to notice and an opportunity to object to any 
alterations of their interests,42 and such alterations must not deprive those 
interests unreasonably or arbitrarily.43 More significantly for purposes of 
this Article, property rights in public pension plans are also subject to the 
protections of the Takings Clause.44 
II. THE VALUE OF A TAKINGS CLAUSE CHALLENGE 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the vast majority of 
states grant public employees some type of contract or property right in 
certain aspects of their retirement benefits, and these rights are subject to 
constitutional protections, including those enumerated in the Takings 
Clause. But takings challenges to plan alterations have not proved very 
successful.45 In large measure, this lack of success results from a tendency 
                                                                                                                 
pension statutes); Spiller, 627 A.2d at 515 (same); Pierce, 910 P.2d at 301 (same); Horvath, 
697 N.E.2d at 652-655 (same). 
 37. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 466. 
 38. See, e.g., Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[T]he language of [the 
public pension statute] remains at best ambiguous, and we cannot find that the legislature as 
a whole unmistakably intended to create contract rights. . . . “). 
 39. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 808; accord Spiller, 627 A.2d at 517 (holding that 
“retirement benefits are more than a gratuity to be granted or withheld arbitrarily at the 
whim of the sovereign state”). 
 40. See Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 517 n.12; Pierce, 910 P.2d at 
301; Ass’n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Wis. 1996). 
 41. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 517 n.12; Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304-
05. 
 42. See Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304-05. 
 43. See Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810. 
 44. See Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304 (stating that “any action by the legislature that serves 
to terminate, diminish or alter the value of pension plans must be compensated”); Ass’n of 
State Prosecutors, 544 N.W.2d at 893 (finding that statute requiring transfer from county 
pension fund to state pension fund effected a taking of county participants’ property). 
 45. See Monahan, supra note 11, at 637 (noting that claims brought under the Takings 
Clause “have been uniformly unsuccessful”); Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise Isn’t a 
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to treat takings claims as entirely dependent on claims brought under the 
Contracts Clause, such that challenges under these two provisions rise and 
fall together.46 In the right context, such treatment makes perfect sense. In 
states where the participants’ interest in a pension plan is protected by 
contract principles, for example, a finding that the challenged alteration is 
not included within the terms of that contract means no protectable interest 
has been taken and, thus, there can be no violation of the Takings Clause.47 
But this analysis does not always fit the legal paradigms. In Budge 
v. Town of Millinocket, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
rejected the plaintiffs’ takings claim because they could not demonstrate 
contract rights to the benefits at issue.48 Although the rejection of the 
takings claim may ultimately have been correct, the curious thing about 
Budge is that the court failed to acknowledge its prior decision in Spiller v. 
State, which had indicated that legitimate retirement expectations might 
qualify as property rights even absent a contract.49 Although the court cited 
Spiller for the proposition that no contractual relationship was created by 
the retirement plan,50 it failed to recognize Spiller’s implication that a 
takings claim could exist apart from such a relationship, nor did it evaluate 
whether the plaintiffs had an independent property interest notwithstanding 
the existence of a contract. Instead, the court simply viewed the employees’ 
takings challenge as derivative of their contract claim.51 
Some scholars have taken a similar tack, describing a Takings 
Clause challenge as “parasitic on a Contracts Clause claim,” such that the 
success of the former depends entirely on the latter.52 Other scholars, while 
acknowledging that the Takings Clause “theoretically” might offer different 
protections than the Contracts Clause, nonetheless conclude that takings 
                                                                                                                 
Promise: Public Employers’ Ability to Alter Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 1673, 1693 (2011) (stating that Takings Clause challenges “have uniformly failed”). 
By using the term “uniformly,” these commentators overstate their cases, providing another 
example of the inadequate treatment takings challenges have received. 
 46. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 58-59 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“The facts here require us to consider whether plaintiffs had the requisite property 
right to support a Takings Clause claim by analyzing their claim under the Contracts 
Clause.”); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 838 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) 
(stating that “analysis under . . . the Takings Clause tracks the same lines as the analysis 
under the Contracts Clause”). 
 47. See Parella, 173 F.3d at 62 (“[B]ecause the plaintiffs have failed to establish a 
contractual right to the withheld benefits, they cannot show that the Board took their 
‘property’ when it withheld the benefits. . . .”); Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 213 (Colo. 
2014) (finding that employees had no contract right in a particular COLA, which meant they 
had no property interest for purposes of takings claim). 
 48. Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 55 A.3d 484, 492 (Me. 2012). 
 49. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 517 n.12 (Me. 1993). 
 50. Budge, 55 A.3d at 489-90. 
 51. Id. at 492. 
 52. Buck, supra note 4, at 93; see also id. at 28 n.10 (“A takings violation may arise 
only if the plaintiffs have a contractual right to the stream of payments, which in turn means 
that a takings claim usually rises or falls along with a contractual claim.”). 
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claims are “unlikely to add much . . . because a participant’s interest in 
pension promises is unlikely to be property unless it is found to be a 
contractual promise protected under the Contracts Clause.”53 
While I agree that, in many contexts, takings challenges to public 
pension reform are properly influenced by the existence of contract rights, it 
is incorrect to regard such challenges as mere “tag-alongs.”54 Doing so 
overlooks the distinction between the contract and property views 
articulated above and (like the court in Budge) ignores the fact that plan 
participants may have protectable property rights even where no contract 
exists. Additionally, viewing claims brought under the Takings Clause as 
nothing more than repackaged Contracts Clause challenges discounts the 
different analytical frameworks that govern those two provisions. 
This Part demonstrates why the Takings Clause has independent 
significance to public pension reform efforts. First, in property view states, 
takings challenges may present the only viable constitutional protection to 
plan participants. Second, even in contract view states, Takings Clause 
analysis is distinct from that governing the Contracts Clause, and this 
distinction may be significant in certain cases. 
A. Property View States 
In states that adopt the property view of public pensions, the 
Takings Clause presents the best option for challenging plan alterations as 
unconstitutional.55 This is so, as an initial matter, because the Contracts 
Clause simply is unavailable. As explained above, courts adhering to the 
property view largely reject the notion that public retirement plans create 
contractual relationships between the government and its employees,56 but 
the existence of a contract is a prerequisite for bringing a claim under the 
Contracts Clause.57 Because a public pension plan creates no contractual 
relationship under the property view, the Contracts Clause perforce offers 
no protection to plan participants where this view is adopted.58 
Accordingly, plan participants must look to some other constitutional 
provision for relief. 
                                                 
 53. Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 63 
(2013). 
 54. See Buck, supra note 4, at 28 n.10 (“In most cases, a takings clause argument 
appears, if at all, only as a tag-along claim to a contracts argument.”). 
 55. To say that the Takings Clause presents the best option is not to say that takings 
challenges will necessarily be successful. The issues related to analyzing a takings claim are 
addressed in Parts III & IV, infra. 
 56. See supra Part I.C. 
 57. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186-87 (1992) (identifying 
existence of contractual relationship as first component of Contracts Clause analysis). 
 58. See, e.g., Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying 
property view to reject Contracts Clause challenge); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 515-16 
(Me. 1993) (same); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 301-02 (N.M. 1995) (same). 
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One potential avenue is to challenge plan changes as violating the 
Due Process Clause. For various reasons, however, such challenges are 
unlikely to meet with any meaningful success. With regard to procedural 
due process, for example, the legislative system itself typically will satisfy 
the requirements that plan participants be given notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.59 Because most changes to public retirement systems are 
accomplished legislatively, courts should have little trouble in determining 
that these requirements are met. Likewise, in most cases, substantive due 
process should pose few difficulties because courts will apply rational basis 
scrutiny to any alterations made in the pension system.60 So long as the 
government can demonstrate that its pension reform measures were 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest—such “as reducing 
expenditures in a time of fiscal crisis”61—those measures will be upheld. 
The other alternative is to attack plan alterations under the Takings 
Clause. Although the success of a takings claim is hardly assured, courts 
may find these challenges more difficult to dismiss because of their distinct 
analytical framework. Unlike a substantive due process analysis, the 
evaluation of a takings claim does not depend on a means-end test. In 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., the Supreme Court explained that its Takings 
Clause jurisprudence focuses on the effects that result from a legislative 
scheme rather than the interests that scheme is designed to promote.62 The 
sort of means-end inquiry utilized under the Due Process Clause “probes [a] 
regulation’s underlying validity,”63 but it reveals nothing about the central 
question with which the Takings Clause is concerned—i.e., whether (and 
how much) the law interferes with private property rights.64 For that reason, 
the Court explained, this type of inquiry “has no proper place in our takings 
jurisprudence.”65 
The upshot is that a takings claim cannot be rejected simply 
because the government’s action is reasonably linked to a legitimate goal or 
                                                 
 59. See, e.g., Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 
2015) (concluding “[t]here is no basis for a finding that the process was lacking” where 
changes to municipal pension benefits were “adopted by the City Council after lengthy 
public meetings with all interested stakeholders”); Pierce, 910 P.2d at 305 (suggesting that 
newspaper notices and open committee hearings were sufficient to meet procedural due 
process requirements). 
 60. See Fallon, 842 F.2d at 601. 
 61. Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 58 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d in relevant part, 123 
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 62. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 543. 
 64. See id. at 539 (stating that takings analysis “focuses directly upon the severity of 
the burden that government imposes upon private property rights”); see also id. at 542 
(explaining that means-ends test about “whether a regulation of private property is effective 
in achieving some legitimate public purpose” says “nothing about the magnitude or 
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 65. Id. at 540. 
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objective. Indeed, “the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has 
acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”66 Accordingly, arguments that 
pension plan changes are rationally related to alleviating legitimate 
budgetary concerns will most likely defeat a substantive due process 
challenge, but they should have no traction in a proper Takings Clause 
analysis. 
B. Contract View States 
A similar case can be made for the Takings Clause even where 
public pensions are viewed as creating contracts. While the Contracts 
Clause offers the primary source of protection in this context, the way 
claims under the Contracts Clause are analyzed potentially leaves room for 
a meaningful Takings Clause challenge in the right circumstances. 
Per its express terms, the Contracts Clause prohibits a state from 
“pass[ing] any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”67 Despite 
this unqualified language, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
“the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal 
exactness like a mathematical formula.”68 The limitations imposed by the 
Contracts Clause must be balanced, the Court has explained, against the 
sovereignty of the states and their needs to utilize that sovereignty in the 
best interests of their citizens.69 
The first step in this analytical balancing act is to determine 
whether the state action being challenged “has, in fact, operated as a 
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.”70 This step thus 
depends on a showing that: (1) a contractual relationship exists; (2) a 
change in the law impaired that relationship; and (3) the resulting 
impairment qualifies as substantial.71 Where any of these characteristics is 
missing, there is no violation. But even where the state has substantially 
impaired a contract, its action may still be upheld if the impairment was 
“reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”72 The 
                                                 
 66. Id. at 543. 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Most state constitutions contain a similar provision. See, 
e.g., COLO. CONST. art II, § 11 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . shall be 
passed by the general assembly.”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 19 (“No . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be enacted by the legislature.”). Moreover, when interpreting 
these provisions, state courts typically apply federal Contracts Clause analysis. See, e.g., 
Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208 (Colo. 2014) (noting state adoption of federal Contracts 
Clause test); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 295 (N.M. 1995) (same). 
 68. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (quoting Home Bldg. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934)). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978). 
 71. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). 
 72. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25; see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. 
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983) (explaining that impairment of contract 
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analysis for a Contracts Clause challenge thus incorporates a means-end test 
similar to that used for substantive due process claims. So long as the 
government can demonstrate the appropriate relationship between the 
challenged legislation and a sufficient governmental interest, no 
constitutional violation will be found.73 
As shown above, this type of means-end analysis is improper under 
the Takings Clause. A takings claim is concerned with the government’s 
effect on private property rights; neither the legitimacy of the government’s 
goals nor the rationality of the government’s method can deflect a takings 
challenge. For this reason, a substantial pension modification that is 
justified as reasonable and necessary under the Contracts Clause might still 
effect a taking of property because the purpose for which the modification 
was implemented is irrelevant to the takings inquiry.74 
III. EVALUATING WHETHER “PROPERTY” HAS BEEN “TAKEN” 
Having demonstrated that the Takings Clause presents an 
independently significant piece of the pension reform puzzle, the next issue 
is to consider how challenges brought under that Clause should be 
evaluated. Such consideration requires a basic understanding of the manner 
in which the Takings Clause has been implemented by the courts, focusing 
on three foundational questions: (1) whether the government has taken 
private property; (2) whether any taking is for a public use; and (3) whether 
the owner has received just compensation for the taking. This Part 
addresses the first of those questions, leaving the second and third questions 
for Part IV.75 
                                                                                                                 
may be justified if based upon “reasonable conditions” and “of a character appropriate to” 
some “significant and legitimate public purpose”). 
 73. See, e.g., Balt. Teachers Union, Am. Fed’n of Teachers Local 340 v. Mayor of 
Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1018-21 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that temporary salary reductions for 
public school teachers constituted a substantial impairment of contract but one that was 
justified as reasonable and necessary). 
 74. See Beermann, supra note 53, at 64 (noting “the government’s justification for a 
taking is irrelevant”); Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 20 n.102 (same); cf. Cherry v. Mayor 
of Balt., 762 F.3d 366, 374 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Contracts Clause claim but vacating 
trial court’s dismissal of public employees’ takings claims and remanding those claims for 
further proceedings). 
 75. Although these discussions focus on federal constitutional requirements, as noted 
above, most state constitutions contain similar constraints on the government’s taking 
authority. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Moreover, although some differences 
exist between state and federal takings law, state courts tend to follow federal decisions in 
this area with regard to most issues. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 100-01 (Cal. 2002) (“[W]e appear to have construed the [federal and 
state takings] clauses congruently.”); E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038, 
1045 n.10 (Colo. 2004) (“[W]e have considered decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court construing the federal takings clause as a guide in determining what constitutes a 
taking.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 
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A. The “Property” Requirement 
Because the Takings Clause only applies to takings, an initial 
question is whether the government has taken private property at all.76 To 
answer this question affirmatively, two independent requirements must be 
satisfied. The first of these is that the claimant must have a protected 
property interest at the time the taking is alleged to have occurred.77 As 
demonstrated above, the existence of a property interest is largely defined 
by state law,78 and the vast majority of states view public pension plans as 
giving participants either a contract or property right in at least some 
portion of their benefits.79 For this reason, in the context of public pension 
reform, evaluating whether a property interest exists should be relatively 
straightforward in most cases. The plans at issue will either create contract 
or property rights in the benefit being modified or they won’t. 
B. The “Taking” Requirement 
Demonstrating that the claimant has a property interest leads to the 
second and more challenging requirement—i.e., the governmental activity 
being complained of must, in fact, amount to a taking of the interest for 
which protection is sought.80 In this regard, the courts have made clear that 
not every governmental action affecting private property is compensable.81 
                                                                                                                 
233, 240-41 (Tenn. 2014) (listing states that apply federal regulatory takings framework to 
claims brought under state constitutional provisions). 
 76. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013) 
(“[T]he Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy—just compensation—only for 
takings.”). 
 77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra Parts I.B & I.C. 
 80. See, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 81.   See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (stating that “not every 
destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the 
constitutional sense”); see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 
(1986) (“[I]t cannot be said that the Taking Clause is violated whenever legislation requires 
one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”). As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the applicability of the Takings Clause to a particular case often depends on 
context: 
When the government condemns or physically appropriates the property, the 
fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however, the 
owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes 
restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or 
appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is 
more complex. 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17 
(2002). 
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Determining when a legislative or regulatory restriction,82 in particular, 
amounts to a taking has proved troublesome, and the conventional wisdom 
is that takings doctrine is a “muddle.”83 Even so, the Supreme Court over 
time has brought a modicum of clarity to this issue, culminating in a multi-
tiered analytical framework.84 
1. Analytical Framework for Determining a “Taking” 
Under this framework, the first question is whether the challenger 
can prove that the law forces him to suffer a permanent physical invasion or 
occupation of his property.85 If so, then the law effects a taking per se and 
no other factors need to be considered.86 
Where no permanent physical invasion occurs, however, the 
framework moves to a second query, asking whether the challenger can 
prove what has been termed a “total” taking—i.e., that the law deprived 
him of all economically productive use of the property.87 An affirmative 
answer to this question raises the presumption that a taking has occurred 
and shifts the burden of proof to the government, which may rebut the 
presumption by demonstrating that the law accomplishes nothing more than 
what could have been achieved under the law of nuisance or similar 
“background principles” of the law of property.88 Where the government 
meets this burden, no compensable taking has occurred; otherwise, the 
presumption of a taking stands and the government must compensate the 
owner.89 
Finally, if a case cannot be resolved under either of the foregoing 
analyses, the framework resorts to “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” 
driven by three factors.90 Known as the Penn Central test, this analysis 
applies to the vast majority of takings challenges and assesses an alleged 
taking based on: (1) the economic impact of the law or regulation being 
challenged; (2) the extent to which the law or regulation interferes with the 
claimant’s distinct, investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character 
of the governmental action, which generally distinguishes between those 
                                                 
 82. Because most public pension reforms are enacted as legislative or regulatory 
modifications to existing plans, challenges to those enactments fall within the branch of 
takings law known as “regulatory takings.” Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321-
23 (distinguishing between “physical takings” and “regulatory takings”). 
 83. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
 84. See generally Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 94-
101 (2008) (explaining framework). 
 85. Id. at 94. 
 86. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). 
 87. Kent, supra note 84, at 95. 
 88. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-32 (1992). 
 89. Kent, supra note 84, at 96. 
 90. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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activities appearing appropriative in nature and those that merely adjust 
“the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”91 
2. Difficulties in Applying the Framework to Public Pension 
Reform 
Most of the decisions establishing and applying the foregoing 
framework involved takings challenges to land use regulations, and though 
not without problems, the framework clearly is designed to operate within 
that milieu. It remains less certain how the analysis functions in other 
regulatory contexts, and this is true of public pension reform in particular. 
Chief among the issues that must be addressed is which portion of the 
framework is most appropriate for analyzing a challenge to pension reform 
legislation. Is altering a promised retirement benefit akin to “invading” or 
“occupying” the participants’ interests in that benefit, such that the per se 
rule applies? What would it mean in the pension reform context to deny 
participants “all economically beneficial or productive use”92 of their 
property, so as to qualify for a “total” taking? Or is pension reform more 
properly viewed as a garden-variety economic regulation that should be 
analyzed under the Penn Central factors? 
The answers to these questions have obvious significance. 
Successfully arguing that a particular reform falls within either the per se 
rule or the “total” taking analysis would clearly favor plan participants. The 
per se rule, once triggered, automatically means a taking has occurred, and 
the only real issue remaining is the amount of compensation the 
government must pay to the property owner. Similarly, triggering the 
“total” taking test will require the government to compensate the property 
owner unless it can rebut the presumption that a taking has occurred. By 
contrast, the Penn Central test is, in practice, more deferential to the 
government, and claims analyzed under that test typically meet with little 
success.93 As in other areas of constitutional law, framing the issues so as to 
fall within the right analytical test can be outcome-determinative of a 
                                                 
 91. Id. 
 92. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 93. Numerous scholars have noted that the government wins a substantial percentage 
of cases analyzed under the Penn Central factors. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do 
Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of 
Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 121, 141 (2003) 
(reviewing data and concluding that, for claims analyzed under Penn Central, “owners 
prevailed in 13.4% of the cases where the merits were addressed”); Basil H. Mattingly, 
Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 695, 744 (2000) (reviewing data to conclude that 
government wins eighty-five percent of Penn Central cases brought in federal district courts 
and sixty-seven percent of such cases brought in Court of Federal Claims); Adam R. 
Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test Or a One Strike Rule?, 
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677, 698 (2013) (reviewing data from three federal circuits and concluding 
that plaintiffs have a success rate of “only 4.0% in all cases citing to Penn Central”). 
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takings claim. Unfortunately, as with most things in the law of takings, 
choosing the appropriate test in the context of public pension reform is 
anything but straightforward. 
C. Choosing the Proper Test 
When considering the three choices available, perhaps the safest 
proposition is that the “total” taking analysis is the least likely to apply. 
Short of the politically unviable course of eradicating pension plans and all 
accrued benefits in their entirety, it is difficult to envision a reform measure 
that could truly be said to deprive participants of all economic value in the 
plans.94 Indeed, the only court found to have addressed the “total” taking 
issue in the public pension reform context explicitly rejected its 
applicability.95 Accordingly, whether any specific reform measure qualifies 
as a taking will most likely depend on whether a court chooses to apply the 
per se rule for physical invasions or the more pervasive and deferential 
Penn Central test. The arguments for both choices are highlighted below, 
beginning with Penn Central. 
1. The Case for the Penn Central Test 
The courts that have most meaningfully analyzed takings 
challenges to pension reform measures have done so under the Penn 
Central test,96 with some explicitly rejecting the per se rule’s applicability 
in this context.97 This result is hardly surprising. For starters, although there 
are notable exceptions, the Supreme Court has exhibited a general 
reluctance to employ categorical analyses under the Takings Clause. 
Throughout its takings decisions, the Court repeatedly has expressed a 
preference for case-by-case inquiries,98 and individual justices have 
                                                 
 94. But see Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. by Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 
890 F. Supp. 1143, 1166 (D.R.I. 1995) (analyzing under Penn Central legislation that 
removed plaintiffs from public retirement system and extinguished all credits accrued). 
 95. See Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 59 (D. Me. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 
123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that legislation raising the retirement age, increasing early 
retirement penalty, and altering method of calculating benefits did not constitute “an 
elimination of the economic value of [participants’] benefits”). 
 96. See, e.g., Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1988); Parker, 937 F. 
Supp. at 58-59; Scigulinksy, 890 F. Supp. at 1166; State ex. rel. Horvath v. State Teachers 
Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 650-51 (Ohio 1998). 
 97. See, e.g., Parker, 937 F. Supp. at 59; Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 648-49. 
 98. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (“Our regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is characterized by 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of 
all the relevant circumstances.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (“[W]e have eschewed the 
development of any set formula for identifying a ‘taking’ forbidden by the Fifth 
Amendment, and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of 
each particular case.”). 
2017] PUBLIC PENSION REFORM 19 
reinforced that point in concurring and dissenting opinions.99 Moreover, in 
its most comprehensive discussion of takings doctrine, the Court explained 
that, apart from the “two relatively narrow categories” of physical invasions 
and total economic deprivations, “regulatory takings challenges are 
governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central.”100 In light of these 
statements, any attempt to broaden the scope of the per se rule is likely to 
face an uphill battle. 
Related to the Court’s general aversion to categorical rules is the 
chief purpose for which its takings doctrine appears to exist. The decision 
rules that make up the law of takings are an example of what Brannon 
Denning and I elsewhere label “anti-evasion doctrines” (“AEDs”)—i.e., 
gap-filling standards designed to prevent the government from formally 
complying with a previously-announced rule while actually undermining 
the substance the rule was designed to protect.101 In this regard, takings 
doctrine seeks to curb governmental efforts to evade the just compensation 
requirement by regulating property rather than appropriating it. Where the 
regulation has the same effects as appropriation, takings doctrine requires 
just compensation to be paid irrespective of the governmental action 
formally employed.102 But the decision to utilize an AED, as well as the 
level of scrutiny to be employed, largely depends on how courts balance the 
risks posed by the allegedly evasive conduct versus those posed by 
heightened judicial intervention.103 Of particular importance to this risk 
assessment, Denning and I argue, is the existence of political safeguards 
that can be expected to adequately prevent governmental overreaching.104 
When applied to the public pension context, these concepts would 
seem to favor the more deferential Penn Central approach. The financial 
consequences of the current situation are both widespread and relatively 
                                                 
 99. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must 
be resisted.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“If one fact about the Court’s takings jurisprudence can be stated without 
contradiction, it is that the particular circumstances of each case determine whether a 
specific restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay 
compensation.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 100. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). The Court also set apart 
“the special context of land-use exactions,” id., which obviously have no bearing on the 
evaluation of public pension reform. 
 101. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in 
Constitutional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1779 (2012). 
 102. See id. at 1777 (characterizing takings doctrine as AED); see also Michael B. 
Kent, Jr., Viewing the Supreme Court’s Exactions Cases Through the Prism of Anti-Evasion, 
87 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 852-55 (2016) (same). 
 103. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Judicial Doctrine as Risk 
Regulation, 82 TENN. L. REV. 405, 418-25 (2015) (arguing that doctrinal formation results, 
in part, from justices’ perceptions of, and attempts to manage, risk to constitutional 
propositions posed by government action). 
 104. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in Constitutional 
Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 424 (2014). 
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well-known, while the potential policy solutions require complex and 
multifaceted considerations. As such, one would expect the political 
process by which reform measures are enacted to be robust and well-
attended by the various interests involved. Under these circumstances, there 
is no guarantee that judicial involvement would outperform the political 
process. Indeed, given the potential for unintended errors, the costs of such 
involvement could be quite high. For these reasons, the Penn Central 
factors may present a safer course than the more intrusive per se rule. 
Further bolstering the popularity of the Penn Central factors is that 
the Court has applied them in a series of cases addressing private sector 
retirement legislation. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, for example, the Court utilized the Penn Central test to 
evaluate a takings challenge to the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”).105 Designed to address financial 
instability in multiemployer pension plans caused by the withdrawal of 
individual employers from those plans, the MPPAA required withdrawing 
employers to pay to the plan a sum representing that employer’s 
proportionate share of the plan’s unvested benefits, irrespective of the 
employer’s liability under the plan contracts.106 Employers subject to this 
“withdrawal liability” asserted that the statute violated the Takings Clause 
by requiring them to transfer private assets to the plans without 
compensation. Although the Court acknowledged that the employers would 
be permanently deprived of the assets used to pay the liability,107 it 
nonetheless indicated that the per se rule was inapplicable because “the 
Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate any of 
the employer’s assets for its own use.”108 The Court reaffirmed this 
conclusion seven years later when it revisited the MPPAA’s withdrawal 
liability provisions,109 and it reached a similar result in a case brought 
against federal legislation that required coal industry employers to 
contribute to a multiemployer benefit plan for industry retirees and their 
dependents.110 
Although each of these cases involved an alleged taking of property 
belonging to a plan employer, the basic principles clearly can be translated 
to takings claims brought by plan participants. If forcing employers to pay 
amounts into a plan over and above their contractual liabilities does not 
amount to a permanent occupation of the sums paid, then forcing 
                                                 
 105. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986). 
 106. Id. at 216-17. 
 107. Id. at 222. 
 108. Id. at 225. 
 109. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 643 
(1993) (“We reject [the challenger’s] contention that the appropriate analytical framework is 
the one employed in our cases dealing with permanent physical occupation. . . .”). 
 110. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 530 (1998) (plurality) (concluding that liability 
for fund contributions “is not . . . a permanent physical occupation . . . of the kind that we 
have viewed as a per se taking”). 
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employees to accept alterations or reductions in the benefits received 
arguably should be viewed the same way.111 And, in fact, several lower 
courts have relied on this line of decisions to evaluate claims brought by 
public employees.112 Echoing Penn Central’s own admonition that “[a] 
taking may more readily be found when the interference with property can 
be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when 
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good,”113 these courts 
have found that public pension modifications fall within the latter 
characterization.114 
Finally, utilizing the Penn Central test avoids any difficulty in 
analogizing pension reform legislation to a “physical” invasion or 
occupation of land. The principal cases developing the per se rule all 
concerned government actions that forced a private landowner to surrender 
his right to exclude others.115 The unifying theme in these cases is that each 
concerned an entry onto the physical boundaries of the property without the 
consent of the owner. In other words, each case involved an action that 
resembled a trespass. But that resemblance is not as evident when it comes 
to public pension reform. In the latter context, the property at issue 
normally will consist of promises to hold plan funds in a certain manner, to 
pay benefits upon the achievement of certain criteria, and to calculate those 
benefits according to a prescribed method. It is difficult, at least on the 
surface, to see how modifications to those promises constitute a trespass or 
entry upon the plan participants’ interests. Unlike land, promises cannot be 
physically inhabited.116 
For the foregoing reasons, I agree that the Penn Central test is an 
easier fit for evaluating challenges to public pension reform, as well as the 
                                                 
 111. A potential distinction between Connolly and its progeny, on the one hand, and 
public pension reform, on the other, is that public pension alterations could be viewed as 
appropriations by the government itself. Cf. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (noting that 
government did not “permanently appropriate any of the employer’s assets for its own use”) 
(emphasis added). For a discussion of this argument, see infra Part III.C.2. 
 112. See Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Connolly); Parker 
v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 58 (D. Me. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
1997) (same); State ex. rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ohio 
1998) (same). 
 113. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 114. Fallon, 842 F.2d at 602; Parker, 937 F. Supp. at 59; Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 649. 
 115. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982) (finding taking under state law that required landowner to permit installation of cable 
television facilities on roof of her building); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) 
(finding taking where government’s use of nearby land for airport resulted in regular flights 
over plaintiff’s parcel at significantly low altitudes); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal 
Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (finding taking where government permanently flooded plaintiff’s 
land in connection with dam project). 
 116. Cf. Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 649 (distinguishing pension reform from leading case 
employing per se rule because that case “involved a permanent physical occupation of real 
property”) (emphasis in original). 
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test most likely to be used by courts engaged in that evaluation. Even so, 
viewing the per se rule as wholly inapplicable to this context seems too 
narrow an interpretation of the rule, which the Court itself has applied to 
interests other than real property. The arguments for applying the per se 
rule should not be overlooked, and it is to those arguments that this Article 
now turns. 
2. The Case for the Per Se Rule 
On at least two occasions, the Supreme Court has referenced the 
per se rule, either directly or indirectly, in cases involving the alleged taking 
of a property interest other than land. In Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. 
v. Beckwith, for example, the Court considered a dispute involving the 
ownership of accrued interest on interpleaded funds paid into a state court’s 
registry.117 The receiver appointed to handle distribution of the funds 
asserted that the interest belonged to the prevailing parties, but a state 
statute provided that such interest belonged to the government. Siding with 
the receiver, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute amounted to a 
taking because it broke with the ordinary rule that owners of the principal 
also own the interest accruing thereon. Describing the statute as “a forced 
contribution to general governmental revenues,” the Court analogized the 
situation to that at issue in one of the early per se cases because, in both, the 
government used private property for its own purposes without the 
permission of the owner.118 “The state statute,” the Court concluded, “has 
the practical effect of appropriating for the [government] the value of the 
use of the fund.”119 
The Court seemingly returned to this rationale several years later in 
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.120 That case involved a state 
program requiring that accrued interest on lawyers’ trust accounts 
(“IOLTA”) be used to pay for indigent legal services. Having previously 
held that such interest belonged to the clients whose funds were invested in 
the accounts,121 the Court then addressed whether the mandatory use of that 
interest under the IOLTA program constituted a taking. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens couldn’t quite bring himself to say that a taking 
had occurred,122 but he suggested that the per se rule for physical invasions 
would be the most appropriate test under which to make that 
determination.123 The transfer of the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts, 
                                                 
 117. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
 118. Id. at 163-64 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)). 
 119. Id. at 164. 
 120. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003). 
 121. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 165-72 (1998). 
 122. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 233 (“[W]e must address the type of taking, if any, that 
this case involves.”) (emphasis added); id. at 235 (“We therefore assume that . . . [the 
plaintiffs’] interest was taken. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 235. 
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he explained, was “akin to the occupation of a small amount of rooftop 
space” that the Court addressed in the leading case applying the per se 
rule.124 Inasmuch as neither bank accounts nor the interest earned on them 
can be physically inhabited or entered into, Justice Stevens’s analogy to an 
“occupation” suggests that the per se rule encompasses more. The rule 
applies, it would seem, where the government affirmatively takes for itself 
or transfers to another the use of private property for public purposes.125 
In both cases, then, the Court equated the rule’s references to 
“invasion” or “occupation” with a similar, though not entirely synonymous, 
term—i.e., “appropriation.” So construed, the per se rule may more readily 
fit the public pension reform context, as evidenced by a few state court 
decisions that tacitly apply that approach. Where Wisconsin gave members 
of a county-run plan the option to join a state-run plan, mandating a transfer 
of employer contributions from one plan to the other for any participant 
exercising that option, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the law 
requiring the transfer effected a taking.126 “Vested County Plan 
beneficiaries have protectable property interests in the integrity and security 
of their retirement funds,” the court explained, and the statute took that 
property interest by appropriating funds previously held by the county plan 
to the benefit of members enrolled in the state plan.127 
A similar rationale appears to have animated the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. State,128 although the conclusory 
analysis in that case leaves much to be desired. Bailey involved an 
adjustment to the tax-exempt status of state and local retirement benefits. 
Initially, those benefits were exempted entirely from state taxation, but the 
legislature later capped the tax exemption to apply only to $4,000 of 
benefits per year.129 Concluding that the retirement plans created a 
contractual relationship between the state and plan participants, and that the 
tax exemption was a term of the contract so created, the court determined 
that the change in the exemption amounted to an uncompensated taking of 
the participants’ property.130 Although the court offered little analytical 
                                                 
 124. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). 
 125. See id. at 240 (“A law that requires that the interest on [IOLTA] funds be 
transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use . . . could be a per se taking 
requiring the payment of ‘just compensation’ to the client.”). Such affirmative action is 
distinguished from mere regulation, which might restrict the use of private property but does 
not necessarily compel its use by or for someone other than the owner. Cf. Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980) (explaining that transfer of 
interest on funds deposited into court’s registry was forced appropriation of fund’s beneficial 
use rather than mere economic adjustment for common good). 
 126. Ass’n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. 1996). 
 127. Id.; see also id. at 894 (equating statute to confiscation of county plan members’ 
property). 
 128. Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54 (1998). 
 129. Id. at 58-59. 
 130. Id. at 69. 
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support for that determination,131 it is not difficult to place the decision 
within the per se rule as articulated above. Under the contracts establishing 
the retirement system, the property belonging to the participants included 
100% of every dollar in benefits paid, without having to remit anything 
back to the state in the form of taxes. By subsequently capping the amount 
of benefits eligible for the tax exemption, however, the state reduced the 
real amount paid to the participants by the amount of taxes now due. As 
such, much like the account interest at issue in Webb’s and Brown, the state 
effectively appropriated the use of the benefits subject to taxation for its 
own purposes. 
By far the clearest application of the per se rule in the context of 
public employee benefits comes from a recent decision of the Michigan 
Court of Appeals. In AFT Michigan v. State,132 the court addressed the 
constitutionality of a statute that required all public school employees to 
contribute three percent of their salaries to a non-vesting retiree health 
benefit program. After concluding that the employees’ salaries constituted 
“specific funds in which they unquestionably had a property interest,”133 the 
court then found that the forced contribution to the retirement fund 
constituted a seizure of the employees’ property. Citing to both Webb’s and 
Brown, the court explained: “The law is . . . clear that where the 
government . . . asserts ownership of a specific and identifiable ‘parcel’ of 
money, it does implicate the Takings Clause. Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has termed such actions ‘per se’ violations of the Takings 
Clause.”134 Put differently, by appropriating for its own benefit a portion of 
the employees’ salaries, the state had triggered the per se rule and taken 
private property without compensation. 
Applying the reasoning of these cases to contemporary reform 
efforts indicates that at least some modifications to public pensions might 
fall under the per se rule. While most of these reforms do not include an 
overt transfer of promised benefits to another party, many of the measures 
recently attempted or discussed could be viewed as having a similar effect. 
Changes in the formulae by which benefits are calculated, reductions in 
stated COLAs, or even a required increase in the employees’ own 
contributions all have the consequence of decreasing the amount of benefits 
ultimately paid to plan participants. Where these participants have a vested 
right in the benefits affected, the reductions arguably are the equivalent of 
the government appropriating the participants’ property (or a portion 
                                                 
 131. See id. (stating simply that “it is clear that the State has taken plaintiffs’ private 
property” because alteration of exemption was “in derogation of plaintiffs’ rights established 
through the retirement benefits contracts”). 
 132. AFT Michigan v. State, No. 303702, 2016 WL 3176812 (Mich. Ct. App. June 7, 
2016). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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thereof) to fulfill its own purposes or obligations.135 As the foregoing cases 
suggest, that type of appropriation might trigger the per se rule and thus 
constitute a compensable taking. 
IV. EVALUATING “PUBLIC USE” AND “JUST COMPENSATION” 
Although it is much easier to demonstrate a taking under the per se 
rule than the Penn Central test, in either case a determination that the 
government has in fact taken private property forces a consideration of the 
public use and just compensation requirements. With regard to public 
pension reform, just compensation is by far the more troublesome issue, as 
the following discussions demonstrate. 
A. The “Public Use” Requirement 
At least for purposes of federal law, the “public use” requirement 
has long been interpreted to include any measure justified by a “public 
purpose,”136 which is defined broadly and with deference to legislative 
determinations.137 Accordingly, the government typically has wide latitude 
in determining when and how the taking power should be utilized. 
Moreover, in the context of regulatory takings, there is a general 
presumption that the government’s action is supported by a public purpose. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has rejected the incorporation of 
means-end analyses into its Takings Clause jurisprudence, concluding that 
questions concerning the government’s purposes for regulating are more 
properly addressed under the Due Process Clause.138 Such inquiries are 
“logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation 
effects a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government 
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”139 Put differently, a 
government action that advances no public purpose will violate due process 
and be unconstitutional for that reason alone.140 By the time the analysis 
                                                 
 135. Cf. Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 187 (W. Va. 1995) (“Requiring the [plan 
participants] to protect the future solvency of the pension system is an unconstitutional 
shifting of the state’s own burden.”) (emphasis added); see also Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 
3d 379, 397 (Fla. 2013) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (arguing that reform legislation converting 
state retirement system from noncontributory to contributory, mandating employees 
contribute three percent of salaries, and eliminating COLAs was “a confiscation of private 
property of a few for a public use”). 
 136. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-80 (2005) (“[W]hen this 
Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it 
embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”). 
 137. Id. (“Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting 
our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.”). 
 138. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
 139. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). 
 140. Id. 
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turns to the Takings Clause, the validity of the government’s purpose is 
theoretically established. 
Applying these principles to public pension modifications suggests 
that, in most cases, the public use requirement should be satisfied rather 
easily. So long as “the asserted public purpose is to avert fiscal calamity 
and its negative consequences,”141 it is difficult to imagine a court finding 
the public use requirement has been violated. 
B. The “Just Compensation” Requirement 
After a taking is determined to be for a public use, the final 
requirement imposed by the Takings Clause is that of “just compensation.” 
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the constitutional remedy is not to 
prohibit the taking,142 but rather to ensure that the owner “be put in as good 
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”143 Thus, the 
owner typically is entitled to “the fair market value of the property on the 
date it is appropriated,”144 which “is measured by the property owner’s loss 
rather than the government’s gain.”145 
Although these principles appear fairly straightforward, they often 
raise difficult issues,146 and this is no less true in the context of public 
pension modifications. It is not within the scope of this Article either to 
provide a full critique of the law of just compensation or to apply that law 
definitively to public pension reform. Rather, as with the question of 
whether a reform takes plan participants’ property, I seek only to highlight 
the issues and arguments that litigants and courts will need to address. 
1. “Dollar-for-Dollar” Valuation 
From the participants’ vantage point, the value of the property lost 
as a result of pension reform would most likely be the dollar amount by 
                                                 
 141. Adam Riff, Note, The Eminent Domain Path Out of a Public Pension Crisis, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 307, 334 (2015). 
 142. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 
U.S. 304, 314 (1987). 
 143. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
 144. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); accord Horne v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015). 
 145. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003). 
 146. There is an inherent tension, for example, in the Court’s statements that a property 
owner should be made whole and its application of the fair market value standard, which 
“excludes whole categories of damages . . . suffered by the property owner.” Christopher 
Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005). Aside from this tension, the concept of fair market value 
itself “necessarily includes a host of background decisions that influence the size of awards.” 
Id. at 704. 
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which their benefits were allegedly reduced.147 To state it differently, plan 
participants would want to argue that the measure of just compensation is 
the difference between the benefits they would have received absent the 
modification and what they actually received as a result of the 
modification.148 This measurement, so the argument goes, would most 
correctly represent the loss to plan participants and most adequately make 
them whole.149 
Using such a formula, however, would likely have the practical 
result of prohibiting the taking altogether, rather than simply remunerating 
the property owner. Public pension reforms are typically enacted to 
alleviate dire fiscal circumstances, meaning that concerns already exist 
about the government’s ability fully to satisfy its plan obligations. 
Requiring the government to pay those obligations anyway effectively 
nullifies the reform. Moreover, given the government’s potential liability 
for interest, attorney fees, and other costs of litigating challenges, the 
government may ultimately find itself in a worse financial situation after 
the reform than before.150 
2. Arguments Against “Dollar-for-Dollar” Valuation 
That plan participants should be awarded compensation exactly 
equal to their pre-reform benefits, however, is not a foregone conclusion. 
To begin with, it is not certain that such an award represents fair market 
value in the first place. The Supreme Court typically defines fair market 
value as “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.”151 The 
lack of a functioning market for a particular species of property may make 
market value too difficult to discern and, thus, inappropriate to use as an 
assessment mechanism.152 This concept could be applied to public pension 
                                                 
 147. See Riff, supra note 141, at 335 n.151 (suggesting that value of property owned by 
“a retired public worker who is already collecting pension benefits” would likely be 
“equivalent to the amount already owed under the pension plan”). 
 148. See Reinke, supra note 45, at 1698 (suggesting that fair market value of reduced 
benefits is “easily calculated” via this formula). If this amount was paid immediately upon 
entry of judgment, it would presumably be adjusted to reflect the present value of any future 
benefits not yet payable under the initial terms of the plan. 
 149. Some courts seem to agree. See, e.g., Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. by Scigulinsky v. Ret. 
Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 890 F. Supp. 1143, 1166 (D.R.I. 1995) (holding that plan 
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extinguished retirement benefits is greater than the amount of money that would be returned 
to the plaintiffs by the [challenged] statute”). 
 150. See generally Wis. Retired Teachers Ass’n v. Emp. Tr. Funds Bd., 558 N.W.2d 83 
(Wis. 1997) (requiring government to refund all amounts taken, with interest, and awarding 
attorney fees). 
 151. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
 152. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) 
(stating that other measures of just compensation may be utilized “when market value has 
been too difficult to find”); United States v. 564.4 Acres, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979) (“The 
instances in which market value is too difficult to ascertain generally involve property of a 
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benefits, “which generally are not assignable, and therefore cannot be 
bought and sold.”153 Because these benefits are not freely traded on the 
open market, it is not necessarily clear that the exact dollar amounts 
initially promised to public employees are the actual “market value” of the 
property held by those employees. 
Additionally, even if it best represents the market value of their 
property, a strict dollar-for-dollar equivalent to participants’ alleged 
reductions may be too speculative, at least as to some portion of the benefits 
claimed.154 In this regard, consider United States v. Commodities Trading 
Corporation, where the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate measure 
of compensation due for a wartime governmental requisition of 760,000 
tons of privately-owned black pepper.155 Noting that the price of pepper at 
the time of the requisition was subject to governmental price-fixing by the 
Office of Price Administration, the trial court nonetheless added to the fixed 
price a so-called “retention value.”156 According to the trial court, this 
“retention value” represented the owner’s right to hold the property until 
after the wartime price-fixing program had ceased, when the owner 
presumably could have sold the pepper for higher prices (an option 
foreclosed by the government’s taking of the pepper).157 The Court rejected 
the inclusion of this “retention value,” however, as too uncertain: 
[N]o one knew how long the war would last nor how long 
economic conditions due to war might lead Congress to 
continue price-fixing legislation. Predictions on these 
subjects were guesses, not informed forecasts. And even if 
such predictions were reasonably certain, there remained 
other unknowns. How much more than the ceiling price 
would a speculative purchaser have paid for property at the 
time of seizure? To what extent, if at all, would the lifting 
                                                                                                                 
type so infrequently traded that we cannot predict whether the prices previously paid, 
assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the condemned 
property.”). 
 153. Riff, supra note 141, at 335-36 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a)); see also GA. CODE 
ANN. § 47-2-332(a)(3) (“The right to a pension, annuity, retirement allowance, return of 
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 154. See Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 126-27 (rejecting inclusion of certain 
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Transp. v. M.M. Fowler, Inc., 637 S.E.2d 885, 892 (N.C. 2006) (explaining that just 
compensation principles “do not require the expenditure of taxpayer funds for losses . . . too 
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 155. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 122. 
 156. Id. at 123. 
 157. Id. at 125. 
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of war controls raise prices above the controlled ceilings? 
And as of what date should future value be estimated?158 
Because there were no sound answers to these questions at the time 
of the taking, the “retention value” had to be excluded from the 
compensation award. 
An analogy could be made to the calculation of promised pension 
benefits, at least for those that have not yet fully accrued as of the date of 
the reform. The amount of benefits to which an individual employee is 
entitled under most state and municipal systems often depends on the 
employee’s age at retirement, number of years worked, and final average 
salary.159 To the extent that any of these factors remains unknown at the 
time of the taking—that is, at the time of the plan modification—the 
valuation of pre-reform benefits arguably could be viewed as too 
speculative to support a compensation award based upon them.160 
Lastly, even where these amounts are not too difficult to calculate, 
there remains the question of whether a dollar-for-dollar valuation would 
work a “manifest injustice” to either the plan participants or the public at 
large.161 In the worst case scenario, requiring government employers to pay 
in full the amount of promised benefits without adjustment could have a 
number of severe societal consequences, including drastic tax increases, 
default on other governmental obligations, and loss of certain governmental 
services. And it could have adverse consequences on public employees as 
well, including reductions in the public workforce, salary and hiring 
freezes, bankruptcy (for municipal employers),162 and the collapse of the 
pension system. In this parade of horribles, it may be that requiring 
governments to compensate plan participants for every dollar allegedly lost 
would work a “manifest injustice.” 
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have 
defined “manifest injustice” or explained when it might justify a deviation 
from fair market value. Perhaps the phrase is best interpreted in light of the 
Court’s oft-stated emphasis that the Fifth Amendment’s compensation 
remedy “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”163 
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 162. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2012) (providing for municipal bankruptcy); see also 
Beermann, supra note 53, at 76 (noting that “there is no provision for state governments to 
file for bankruptcy under federal law”). 
 163. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). 
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From the perspective of plan participants, of course, this notion 
would favor a dollar-for-dollar valuation of their lost property because 
“fairness and justice” requires the government to live up to its promises. 
Moreover, if tax increases and lost services are the price for doing so, then 
at least the public as a whole (and not just the subset of government 
employees/retirees) pays the price. On one level, this argument has 
particular force. After all, the public pension crisis is the result of 
government officials seeking to fulfill an ever-expanding demand for 
government services by the same public that generally revolts against 
increased taxes.164 To the extent that those officials, with the tacit approval 
of taxpayers, have been underfunding those promises, it seems reasonable 
that all parties should share in the burden of “making things right.” 
But on another level, perhaps it’s not that easy. Do “fairness and 
justice” dictate, for example, fiscal and governmental calamity because the 
government, in more prosperous times, made promises to a subset of the 
population? Does the just compensation requirement demand that public 
services be placed at risk to satisfy obligations that now seem imprudent or 
harmful? Another anchor tenet of the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence is that changes in property rights must occasionally occur to 
promote the public interest, and that “Government hardly could go on” if 
every jot and tittle of these changes must be recompensed.165 Some losses, 
the Court has explained, are “properly treated as part of the burden of 
common citizenship.”166 
In short, different maxims support varying views as to whether plan 
participants should receive the full equivalent of their reduced benefits as 
just compensation. As with most things in the law of takings, the relevant 
decisions contain, at best, general precepts that often appear to be in 
competition with one another and foreclose certain predictions or easy 
application. Suffice it to say, there are serious arguments on both sides of 
this question, and its resolution awaits development in future litigation. 
3. The Possibility of Non-Cash Compensation 
A final issue worthy of consideration is whether state and local 
employers might provide compensation to plan participants through means 
other than cash payments, thereby reducing some of the fiscal concerns that 
                                                 
 164. See Beermann, supra note 53, at 26-27 (comparing unfunded pension promises to 
other types of deficit spending). 
 165. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see also Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987) (“The Takings 
Clause has never been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a specific 
individual has suffered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received. 
Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no 
one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes 
paid and the dollar value of benefits received.”). 
 166. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). 
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a taking might otherwise produce. In this regard, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that “consideration other than cash . . . may be counted in the 
determination of just compensation.”167 Such non-cash compensation may 
include benefits conferred upon the property owner as a consequence of the 
taking itself.168 Thus, in the classic example, “damages arising from the 
condemnation of a sliver of property for a new road are offset by the 
enhanced value of the owner’s remaining property as a result of the 
road.”169 Similarly, the Supreme Court has hinted that certain rights created 
by the government concomitant with the alleged taking—such as 
transferable development rights (“TDRs”) in the land use context—might 
also qualify as a form of just compensation that can reduce or eliminate the 
need for monetary payment.170 
Applying these decisions to the public pension context, the question 
is whether a government can build into a pension reform some type of 
compensating benefit for the participants. One interesting proposal along 
these lines recently appeared in the Cardozo Law Review. In a student note, 
Adam Riff recommends that state and local governments employ the 
Takings Clause as a reform mechanism itself, affirmatively condemning 
their employees’ public pension benefits.171 With regard to the just 
compensation requirement, Riff further recommends that a governmental 
unit adopting this approach: (1) fulfill its current pension obligations as to 
any benefits already earned by participants as of the date of the 
                                                 
 167. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Co., 419 U.S. 102, 151 (1974). 
 168. See, e.g., id.; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897). Whether such benefits 
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151-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Finally, almost twenty years after Penn Central, Justice 
Scalia (joined by Justices O’Connor and Thomas) expressly voiced his view that TDRs may 
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when his property is taken.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 750 
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 171. Riff, supra note 141, at 350-51. 
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condemnation; and (2) “establish a new retirement plan with value on the 
market that will benefit current workers on services performed going 
forward, such as a 401(k).”172 The establishment of an alternative retirement 
plan, Riff argues, could be analogized to “special benefits” or TDRs that 
reduce or satisfy any just compensation owed for the taking.173 
To see why, it is necessary to take a brief tangent into the world of 
retirement plan composition. Most government retirement plans are 
structured as defined benefit systems,174 meaning that participants receive a 
fixed benefit upon retirement calculated with regard to their respective 
ages, salaries, and lengths of employment.175 These benefits are typically 
funded by contributions into an investment pool controlled by the 
employer, who also bears the risks of underfunding because it must pay the 
benefits at the set amount regardless of shortfalls in the pool.176 By contrast, 
the 401(k) plans used by most private employers are defined contribution 
systems, which typically fund retirement benefits through some 
combination of employer and employee contributions to individual 
employee savings accounts.177 In these plans, the employers’ obligation is 
simply to contribute at the promised level, not to guarantee any specific 
return or entitlement to the account holder.178 Thus the participants 
themselves bear the ultimate risk179 but also enjoy certain advantages not 
found in most defined benefit plans—e.g., more liberal vesting rules, 
increased portability, and greater control over the amount of their own 
contributions and choices of investments.180 
Because defined contribution plans do not place the employer at 
risk for unfunded future liabilities, over time they would be less costly for 
the government and the taxpayers. At the same time, defined contribution 
plans would provide benefits to plan participants not enjoyed under the 
current retirement structures. In effect, Riff’s proposal calls for government 
employers to use the savings occasioned by the taking of participant rights 
in a defined benefit plan to pay for the creation of other participant rights in 
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 173. Id. at 338-40. Other scholars have made similar recommendations—i.e., that state 
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a defined contribution plan.181 And the value of these latter rights, he 
argues, should be included in any just compensation awarded to the plan 
participants for the taking of the former rights.182 
Riff’s overall proposal, of course, envisions direct takings pursued 
by the government. But the ideas about compensation, if workable, should 
apply equally to takings challenges advanced by plan participants. Indeed, 
on the surface anyway, the argument has an intuitive attraction. Finding a 
way to compensate plan participants while simultaneously reducing the 
government’s overall pension liabilities would seemingly be a desirable 
outcome to any takings problem. Moreover, to the extent that the 
government provides real and valuable benefits in exchange for the 
property it takes, those benefits should be credited toward the satisfaction of 
any compensation the government otherwise owes. Given the lack of 
specific precedent and the general disorder of takings doctrine, however, 
whether courts ultimately agree with these propositions is anyone’s guess. 
CONCLUSION 
The fiscal conditions relating to their pension systems pose unique 
problems for the strength and wellbeing of municipal governments in the 
first part of the twenty-first century. As recent litigation has demonstrated, 
effectively addressing those problems requires consideration of the 
constitutional protections afforded to plan participants. Among those 
protections, the Takings Clause has largely received a sort of subordinate 
status, taking a back seat to the Contracts Clause in much of the case law 
and scholarly commentary. 
Properly considered, however, the Takings Clause forms an 
important component of the public pension reform conversation. In states 
that reject the contract view of public pensions, the Takings Clause presents 
the most viable constitutional claim for plan participants seeking to 
challenge reform efforts. Moreover, the analytical distinctions between 
claims advanced under the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause may 
make takings challenges attractive even in states that adopt the contract 
view. 
For these reasons, the Takings Clause and challenges brought under 
it should receive more serious engagement than they have heretofore 
garnered. A full evaluation of takings challenges requires fitting public 
pension reform within the Supreme Court’s framework for determining 
when legislative or regulatory action qualifies as a taking. Additionally, 
difficult questions exist with regard to the proper measure of compensation 
owed to plan participants once a taking is found. This Article highlights 
some of the leading arguments with which judges and litigants must deal, 
                                                 
 181. See Riff, supra note 141, at 338 (“[T]he government could use the condemned 
property to establish a defined contribution plan that benefits workers going forward.”). 
 182. Id. at 338-40. 
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with the hope that full development of these issues will be advanced by 
courts and commentators in the future. 
